This is an entirely unconvincing - and potentially dangerous - legal analysis published by these former JAGs.
— Dr. Brian L. Cox (@BrianCox_RLTW) December 1, 2025
For present purposes, let's ignore the fact that this "working group" is composed of completely anonymous former JAs. Instead, here I'll focus on the most glaring… https://t.co/SnYXTRiyvo pic.twitter.com/Lq0KiYT13L
This is an entirely unconvincing - and potentially dangerous - legal analysis published by these former JAGs.
For present purposes, let's ignore the fact that this "working group" is composed of completely anonymous former JAs. Instead, here I'll focus on the most glaring deficiencies deficiencies you should consider when you're evaluating whether YOU are convinced by their (completely anonymous) claims.
Below, I'll start with the decisive issue first, then catch a few other significant errors. Then the analysis will close by explaining why this (completely anonymous) publication is potentially dangerous - not just the statement, but the popular trend of which it is part (spoiler alert: it involves creating division & doubt in the US military by falsely claiming orders are illegal and, therefore, don't need to be followed).
Ok, let's start with the decisive flaw in this (completely anonymous) statement: not once does it use or consider the term "military objective." Here's the most relevant provision of the statement on this topic:
"In essence, the Geneva Conventions and other longstanding international maritime laws prohibit U.S. forces from doing anything to survivors of a military attack that destroys the vessel or aircraft carrying them other than rescuing them. They certainly prohibit U.S. forces from killing them."
Seems fairly reasonable at first glance, no? But, what does it do to your assessment if you substitute the word "disables" for "destroys?" Because that's what the WaPo story claims (also from completely anonymous sources). Here's a quote from the news article:
Admiral Mitch Bradley (reportedly) directed the follow-up attack since "the survivors were still legitimate targets [and] because they could theoretically call other traffickers to retrieve them and their cargo.”
More about the survivors in a second. About the boat, the facts as reported indicate it wasn't "destroyed" in the initial attack but was, rather, disabled. This means these (anonymous) former JAs have mischaracterized the status of the boat - and this completely flips the conclusion regarding whether the "order" (more about that later, too) was lawful. Here's why.
If the boat were destroyed, there would be nothing serviceable left of it. But if it's disabled - that is, if the decision-maker believed it could still be used to call other narcotraffickers to retrieve their cargo - the boat still qualifies as a military objective. And military objectives can be intentionally attacked.
That begs the question: What is the definition of a military objective? I'm glad you asked, because
@DeptofWar
doctrine aligns perfectly with the widely-recognized conventional definition established in a treaty 🇺🇸 hasn't ratified.That is, a "military objective" is "any object which by its nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage" (pic 1, sourced from DoD Law of War Manual, which is the same as art. 52(2) of AP I but singular instead of plural).
So, does a "destroyed" boat meet that definition? Probably not. But what about a disabled boat? Well, if the commander does believe it can call for assistance & allow it to continue its mission, then it is - by definition - and object which by its use makes an effective contribution... .
In short - according to the factual scenario reported in the
@washingtonpost
story, the boat still qualified as a military objective after the initial attack & therefore the second strike was not a "war crime" (as the statement claims).Now, if you read the statement very closely - guess how many times you'll see the term "military objective"? That's right. None.
And do you think there's a provision of "the Geneva Conventions and other longstanding international maritime laws prohibit U.S. forces" that would criminalize an attack directed against a military objective? That's right. No, except maybe the LOAC proportionality rule (which I'll address below).
There are so many other mistakes & inaccuracies in this statement that it would take quite a long(er) post to address them all - and tbh that was my plan when I first read the statement. Maybe I'll write up a comprehensive compendium of the errors in the statement at some point, but unfortunately for now it's late & I'm pretty beat & I do need to get up pretty early in the morning. So, what follows here is just the highlights.
- Hors de combat.
The statement correctly notes that attacks cannot be directed against persons who are hors de combat - which basically means they're out of the fight due to sickness, injury, wounds, or detention. Because I'm just hitting the highlights here, I'm not going to split hairs regarding whether combatants and civilians taking direct part in hostilities can qualify as hors de combat and, for the latter, under what conditions. Let's just assume that civilian DPH (as the narcotraffickers were designated by
@StateDept
& DoW) can in fact so qualify when they're shipwrecked.Fine. And let's concede that passengers formerly on a boat (whatever their combatant status) that has been "destroyed" are incapacitated due to shipwreck & therefore ARE hors de combat. They're not "shipwrecked" if they're on a military objective. Their watercraft is still targetable, even if they themselves are completely incapacitated due to wounds from the first attack (unlikely since the commander believed they were capable of calling for reinforcements).
If the suspected narcotraffickers are present on a military objective and if they are unable to defend themselves due to injury/wounds, let's go ahead & call them hors de combat for the sake of argument. They're still on a military objective - so the expected incidental damage of injuring/killing (likely the latter) them in a second strike would need to be assessed along with the concrete & direct military advantage gained from (actually) completely destroying the boat. If the former (expected incidental damage) were excessive in relation to the latter (anticipated mil advantage), then the attack would violate the LOAC proportionality rule.
Any guesses what else is missing from the analysis in the statement? That's right: whether the boat qualified as a military objective (as reported, it did) - and if so, whether the 2 survivors were themselves incapacitated - and if so, whether the attack would still be lawful nonetheless pursuant to the LOAC proportionality rule.
- "No quarter".
Tbh I find this narrative to be just completely bizarre. Yes, ordering subordinates to accept no quarter (that is, to take no prisoners) is in & of itself a war crime - even if the subordinates don't actually carry out the order (fun fact: "no quarter" is the only order that, in itself, is a war crime).
But it's simply bizarre that we even get this narrative from the WaPo story as reported. Here's the relevant text from that article"
"Defense [sic] Secretary Pete Hegseth gave a spoken directive, according to two people with direct knowledge of the operation. 'The order was to kill everybody,' one of them said."
So, the "kill everybody" order was apparently given before the operation. There's a timing issue that just doesn't add up here regarding the "no quarter" claim.
Let's say a commander orders subordinates to "kill everybody" as they assault an enemy trench. That can (and probably should) be reasonably interpreted as an order to direct attacks against adversarial combatants and/or civilians DPH. If the subordinate encounters a fighter who is hors de combat, doesn't it seem likely that s/he will consider that, in accordance with their training, to be an exception to the order to "kill everyone"?
If so, people claiming (as the statement does) the "order to kill everybody" can "reasonably be regarded as an order to 'give no quarter'" are wrong for at least 2 major reasons.
First, they're substituting their own subjective understanding of the order for the commander's and/or the subordinates. Context & interpretation matter since an order to "kill everybody" may not be intended or received as a directive to "give no quarter."
Second, they're assuming this characterization of the order is verbatim as expressed by
@SecWar
@PeteHegseth
. As the letter begins, "the Secretary of Defense [sic] personally issued orders to 'kill everybody'" (emphasis added). But that's not necessarily consistent with what the WaPo story said. Here's the pertinent quote directly from the news article again:''The order was to kill everybody,' one of them said."
Is this anonymous source conveying an accurate & verbatim recollection of SecWar's order? That's what the anonymous former JAGs claim - and nearly every other media story and/or statement from a sitting member of Congress treats it the same.
But what if this anonymous source is paraphrasing? Or not presenting an accurate description of SecWar's order? Doesn't this change how we should all consider this supposed order to take no quarter?
As
@KurtSchlichter
suggested in a tweet I reposted 2 down from this on my TL: this is "anonymous double hearsay." Is this really the standard by which we're going to denounce the sitting fucking Secretary of War of the United States of America as a war criminal?If that's enough for you, that says a lot more about you than it does about Pete Hegseth. And that goes for this group of anonymous former JAs who posted this statement.
- "'Pending' IHL".
Ok, I was going to save this one for a later day - but the international law nerd in me just can't. There's more to say about this later - but there is absolutely no such thing as "pending" IHL. The statement makes this claim because the authors really badly want to apply the text of Additional Protocol II (1977) to the 1949 Geneva Conventions even though 🇺🇸 hasn't ratified this treaty (though, they express that now's the time!).
Can you imagine a judge advocate standing in front of a commander and giving advice that sounds something like this?
"Well, ma'am, if we had ratified AP II then you would need to do this. And I really want us to ratify AP II. So even though we haven't, my advice is that you have a legal obligation to take this action because AP II would require it if we did ratify the treaty as we should."
Bonkers, right? And yet, that's exactly what these anonymous former JAs are telling OUR servicemembers by citing to a treaty we haven't "yet" (read: won't) ratify. More about our servicemembers when we get to the duty not to obey "unlawful" orders.
- Armed conflict vs. law enforcement.
The statement presents an analysis in the alternative: one if this is an armed conflict such that LOAC does apply; and another if it's not an armed conflict such that human rights law applies.
This is an interesting subject academically -but for operators, it's a moot point. DoS/DoW has determined this is a noninternational armed conflict - meaning, for our operators, LOAC applies. There's more to say on this subject at a later date, but for now I'll leave it there since the big takeaway here is the dangerous trend of constantly reemphasizing that "unlawful" orders don't need to be followed.
Ok, so that's the substantive analysis of at least the highlights I'll address on this occasion. Let's turn now to the "unlawful" orders issue to close out here.
While it seems harmless & self-evident to (continuously) reiterate troops are only required to follow lawful orders, this innocuous "reminder" isn't all that's going on here.
This constant reminder in popular public discourse is being coupled with commentary insisting senior civilian and/or military leadership is routinely engaged in giving unlawful orders that don't need to be followed.
One major problem with this current trend is that the people who are advancing this narrative are essentially substituting their own judgment about what is "lawful" for that of personnel who are actually advising in practice or who are actually making decisions & giving orders based on that advice.
This has got to stop. To be perfectly blunt, this trend constitutes a clear and present threat to the national security interests of the United States of America.
It's bad enough that a servicemember is going to get court-martialled for refusing to follow actually lawful orders - and "well, I read from a statement published by some anonymous former judge advocates that the order was unlawful" won't be a legitimate defense.
The national security risk is that troops are going to start questioning en masse what are actually lawful orders because they don't know any better. This can corrode good order & discipline in the ranks and result in missed opportunities on the battlefield - which can itself result in mission failure and/or loss of life among our own troops.
This entire popular trend is irresponsible & dangerous. Troops don't need a fucking reminder that they only have to follow lawful orders. That's drilled into our brains starting very early on in basic training - and it's part of the ethos & values we live every day.
The whole point of this "reminder" is to create doubt. To foster uncertainty. Even to encourage dissent & sedition among the ranks as thousands of outside voices keep claiming - without merit - that orders being issued are manifestly unlawful & therefore don't need to be obeyed.
Enough. As the substantive analysis above indicates, these allegations of "unlawful" orders are based on a misrepresentation of the law that actually exists in doctrine. This is the version of the law our servicemembers are expected to follow - not the version published by a working group of anonymous former judge advocates.
One person who is almost certainly involved in this project, Brenner Fissell (
@brennerfissell
) recently suggested I am shredding my "reputation in real time for the entire academic community to see" for challenging the commentary presented in this statement. As I indicated in response, and based on the points raised in the critical analysis above, they should be worried about shredding their own reputation.They should, at least, if they ever muster the intestinal fortitude required to step out from behind the cover of anonymity & take ownership for their erroneous legal analysis & seditious "reminders" regarding "unlawful" orders.
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